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goals of the arbitration system. 
Corporations already are picking and
choosing which claims they want to litigate and 
which they want to arbitrate, based on their 
own view about when arbitration or litigation 
provides them with the biggest advantage over 
their potential adversaries. What corporations 
do not want is a state court or legislature acting 
to try to level the playing field by regulating 
the way that companies can make those self­
interest-maximizing choices. 
Which brings me to my final point: that 
corporate hostility to arbitration reveals how 
the FAA’s preemptive reach has been inter­
preted too broadly and that states should have 
greater leeway to regulate arbitration to protect 
the interests of their citizens. 
As mentioned at the beginning of this 
article, corporate interests have vigorously
fought against any state regulatory efforts as 
representing “hostility” to arbitration that is 
preempted by the FAA. Yet, corporate carve-
outs reflect the belief that arbitration can be an 
inferior form of dispute resolution for certain 
types of claims or when utilizing certain types 
of procedures. 
State efforts to regulate arbitration are no 
different: They reflect a view that certain types 
of claims are less well-suited for arbitration 
than others, or that certain procedures in arbi­
tration may make the process unfair or signifi­
cantly disadvantageous for one party. 
If corporations can write their arbitration 
clauses to acknowledge the uncontroversial
proposition that arbitration may sometimes 
be a less-fair alternative to litigation, then state 
courts and legislatures should also be allowed 
to craft laws and doctrines that recognize this 
reality. 
* * *
Improving the legitimacy—and also the per­
ceived legitimacy—of arbitration is important 
for all parties involved. Failing to do so creates 
the risk that Congress will enact legislation, as 
has been proposed for many years, to dramati­
cally alter the arbitral landscape. Taking note 
of and responding to corporations’ own hostil­
ity to arbitration is important for maintaining 
arbitration’s reputation as a legitimate form of 
dispute resolution into the future. 
Commentary 
Confessions and Redemption—and Politics—  
For an Un-Neutral Person Who Mediates 
BY MARJORIE CORMAN AARON 
My color choices are bold over neu­tral. I am not known for takinganything but strong positions on
politics, economics, education, ethics, aes­
thetics, you name it. My political views
are now so strongly formed and
deeply felt that I avoid learning
political affiliations of mediation
parties or lawyers, or my students,
to preserve my ability to serve as a
neutral mediator or fair professor. I
hereby confess that I reject editorial col­
umnists’ scolding to respect the other side in
political conversations, unless to gain insight
and strategic advantage for their eventual
persuasion.
My inner railings and outer rants about 
what is wrong-headed, immoral, cruel, unjust, 
ineffective, misdirected, and dishonest within 
our current political and economic realities 
prompt questions for me: 
So, why am I a professional neu­
tral? Why have I spent 30-plus years 
as a mediator and occasional arbitra­
tor? When I mediate, I lack ultimate 
power to effectuate an outcome I 
believe to be right. Even in arbitration, 
I am constrained. I cannot jettison lawful 
contracts, even if they seem usurious to me. 
What are the consequences of putting one’s 
professional energies into a profession that 
aims at settlement, instead of advocacy? 
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Long ago, Prof. Owen Fiss decried ADR for 
choosing settlement as its goal. I rejected Fiss’ 
Against Settlement (93 Yale L.J. 1073 (1983­
1984) (available at https://bit.ly/2OCJupg)) at 
the time. Recent ruminations cause me to
wonder whether I should regret that—even if 
too late to undo. 
Acknowledging the allure of a redemption 
narrative, can I find one that is intellectually 
honest? Can we mediators who are decidedly 
un-neutral as to morality, politics, and justice 
claim professional neutrality in ADR as a posi­
tive force? 
After a step back, and some reckoning with 
the world as it is, not as Fiss believed it to be, 
I’m relieved to report that my answer is yes. 
Perhaps this relief is unfortunate, as it rests on 
the reality of flawed justice and legal systems 
that often make settlement or private process 
the better alternatives. 
As mediators and arbitrators, we can and 
often do achieve good and right results, defined 
as diminishing financial and emotional harm, 
Commentary
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at least for an individual and sometimes for 
many.
‘ROMANTICIZED UNREALITY’ 
Better decisions are based in reality, not roman­
ticized unreality. 
Some romanticizing helps us stay married. 
If spousal realities are not recognizable in the 
romantic illusion, however, the consequences 
of staying will inevitably become real. Separa­
tion is the wiser decision. 
The parties’ decision to settle, or to medi­
ate in hopes of settlement, may be seen as a 
decision to separate from our formal legal 
system. Even where settlements occur “in the 
shadow of the law,” they are not bound by what 
law or judicial process might impose. 
Given the realities of the legal system’s 
inevitable flaws and frequent failures to meet 
parties’ needs, an ADR neutral’s or ADR pro­
gram’s facilitation or encouragement of that 
separation decision is a kind act. 
Arguments against settlement of individ­
ual cases, as articulated by Prof. Fiss, belie a 
fantasy, a romantic view of the relationship 
between justice, truth, law and our legal sys­
tem. Fiss wrote that “settlement  is a capitula­
tion to the conditions of mass society and 
should be neither encouraged nor praised.” Id. 
at 1075. 
He described claimants in media­
tion  as  “plea bargaining”  away their oppor­
tunity for real justice.  He characterized  these 
claimants  as left with an unrequited yearning 
for justice in the form of adjudication that 
yields truth and legal vindication. 
The real truth is that it’s naive to believe 
that court judgments—judicial  rulings and
jury verdicts—deliver pure justice under the 
law, that their judgments are somehow true 
or right. 
Far too many years of elections, litigation, 
mediation, classroom and CLE experiments, 
and trial competitions, and far too much read­
ing in news outlets and research literature on 
decision-making, establish the folly of con­
fidence in the “justice” or “rightness” of any
human judgment in any human system. Con­
sider the following: 
•	 In every election, voters perceive and
evaluate candidates and issues differ­
ently. A candidate seems inept and evil to 
some, clever savior to others. It’s true that 
the  electorate need not measure a candi­
date against legal  standards;  voters’ judg­
ments may reflect different values, priori­
ties or information sources. Still, elections 
offer dramatic and consequential evidence
of human variation in observation, percep­
tion, information processing, and critical 
analysis.
•	 Even decision makers viewing  exactly the
same evidence, applying the same legal 
Defending ADR 
The neutral’s burden: Coming to 
the mediation table with beliefs. And 
biases. 
The challenge: How the current 
realities—’the way law and polity are 
now’—affect settlement. 
The conclusion: ‘[W]e need not 
be neutral about the integrity and 
humanity with which we conduct dis­
pute resolution in our own spaces.’ 
standards reach different findings and de­
cisions. Even when facts are undisputed, 
they reach different conclusions. For ex­
ample, a federal case may be tried in equity 
to a judge and appealed to a circuit court 
panel of three; two join in an opinion to 
uphold, one dissents. Which decision is 
justice? One hundred lawyers hear and de­
cide the same simulated arbitration. One-
third of the group finds no liability and 
awards $0; two-thirds finds liability and 
awards damages ranging from $100,000 
to $6 million. Which verdict represents 
“justice”? 
•	 Do judges and juries “apply the law”
as it was intended? I ruminate over  the 
failed mediation of a business case involv­
ing a plaintiff who, to my ears, had been 
the victim of deceit and malfeasance. The 
plaintiff later won the jury trial but lost 
on appeal based on a legal argument I had 
thought preposterous. The appellate judges 
and I all went to law school: What result 
was just? That same party then lost on her 
adversary’s defamation suit, also based on 
an argument I would have dismissed on 
summary judgment. Was this justice too? 
What if these rulings had gone the op­
posite way? 
•	 And what of disputed facts? So often, in­
cluding in cases with social and civil rights 
implications, parties’ accounts of what hap­
pened differ wildly. Each recounts vivid 
perceptions and memories, convinced of 
the other’s villainy. 
Science tells us perception and memory are 
subject to bias, distortion, and unconsciously 
reconstructed narratives. “Justice” must choose 
a side. So, what’s a jury or a judge to do? 
They can only apply their own cognitive 
filters,  biases, perceptions of witnesses, docu­
ments, and other evidence, and try to discern 
a narrative of what happened. That’s all the 
system can ask for. 
The romantic sees justice as law applied 
to truth, law as clear, and truth determinable. 
To that vision, I say, look at the messy, human 
world in which law and courts originate and 
operate. In this world, no one should imagine 
jurors’ or judges’ findings represent “the truth” 
or its consequences “justice.” 
Is it fair to ask litigants to go all the way 
through the realities of a costly, slow, and 
draining litigation process in our court sys­
tem, where results are inevitably uncertain
and often unable to address their interests or 
protect their legal rights? Will the parties really
be better off for enabling those judgments to 
be rendered?
What Fiss calls “capitulation,” I would
call a practical and wise decision given those 
realities. 
A SEARCH FOR GRACE 
In our rotting institutional landscape, there’s a 
search for grace in ADR’s houses. 
Drawn from philosophy and political the­
ory, early and sweeping critiques of alterna­
tive dispute resolution were premised on the 
notion the law’s foundation is morally and 
publicly derived, laudably expressing moral
and public values. 
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A benefit of adjudicated outcomes would 
be that they effectuate those laws within the 
polity, and thus benefit the public—individu­
ally and collectively. ADR’s settlements would 
undermine the law’s foundation and diminish 
the public’s benefit. 
In these times, I regret to say that this
notion seems terribly quaint and regrettably
untrue. In the United States of 2020, the
deeply sunk pillars undergirding any roman­
ticization of law and legal process have been
proven fictional or so rotted as to have dis­
integrated. We have witnessed destruction of
faith in the power of legal, moral, and political
norms. Of course, the notion that democracy
“with liberty and justice for all” ever existed
derives from uninformed and naïve white
privilege. 
Perhaps worse has been disintegration of 
faith in law as public morality, as we have 
watched lawmakers’ failure to correct executive 
overreach and stark cruelty to individuals and 
populations of vulnerable human beings. 
We are now post-Mueller report, post-
obstruction of congressional subpoenas, post-
impeachment “trial,” post-onslaught of heinous
laws criminalizing women’s choices and walk­
ing the ramp toward a Supreme Court likely
to  vacate precedent and validate  these laws,
post- (and still)  caging children and families,
post-cruelty to refugees, post-shame at denial
of all inconvenient truths—reality at the border,
of police brutality, racial oppression, poverty’s
trap,  poisonous chemical pollutants, and the
earth’s march to inhabitable climate conditions.
Oh yes, and yet again, these times
include shameless and shameful lies to  justify 
Afghanistan and other endless wars, in which 
no warmonger’s kin will suffer or die, only 
distant poor, brown-skinned, or other “oth­
ers” for the sake of distraction, capitalism, and 
reinforcing the powerful. Distorted racist nar­
ratives invoke national defense against refugees 
and civil rights protesters and ignore the need 
to defend our nation against radicalized home­
grown militias. 
Not morality, not humanity, not fealty
to political or legal process built on truth, 
evidence, or just outcome: Only power is
accorded value. When political party and pres­
idential obeisance  seem  paths  to the font of 
power, too  many lawmakers abdicate  respon­
sibilities  required by our political and legal 
system.
They fail to honor law-made separation 
between branches of government, fail to exer­
cise oversight powers, fail to reject patently 
false information, fail to seek or insist on truth, 
fail to guard against corruption, fail to protect 
the electoral process, and fail to protect it from 
takeover by foreign agents. 
ADR IN OUR
CURRENT STATE 
It is against these realities—the way law and 
polity are now—that we, as ADR neutrals and 
advocates and parties and administrators face 
the question of settlement in the current realm 
of dispute resolution.
Here’s the question re-asked in light of 
our current state: Are settlements achieved 
through widespread and institutionalized sys­
tems of dispute resolution better than the
alternative—a legal system without it? It would 
appear that individuals and the collective often 
gain more from the dispute resolution mecha­
nisms than any abstract loss to the legal system. 
What of the charge that ADR providers 
and promoters of institutionalized ADR have 
deepened power imbalances within our legal 
system? Not guilty! 
I raise the charge and the verdict here 
because at its inception, the ADR movement 
was charged just that. Experience suggests the 
opposite is true: ADR systems may be credited 
with modest leveling of power imbalances in 
certain aspects of litigation. 
Perhaps the more astute question is
whether, in the majority of cases, are court pro­
ceedings—litigation and trial—better forums 
for rebalancing power than ADR? Both fortu­
nately and unfortunately, mostly not. 
At the risk of stating the obvious: Unequal
resources cause power imbalances among
litigating parties. Cases end because parties
can’t pay to prosecute their claims. Well-
resourced parties buy high-priced lawyers,
costly discovery, and motion-filled dockets.
Default judgments are entered against con­
sumers, tenants or small business owners
who can’t afford counsel and aren’t aware of
legitimate defenses. Justice delayed is indeed
justice denied—and also tends to favor the
powerful.
When the wait for compensation for real 
harms is long, people are forced into financial 
duress. Is it fair or useful ask an individual 
plaintiff or a small company to bear the full 
costs  of discovery—for whom? For what? To 
be squeezed so that they have even less power 
to negotiate on the eve of trial? 
Even with contingency fee counsel, a liti­
gant who might have bargained for an early 
fair settlement has far less bargaining power 
two years later, when reduced to financial
desperation.
The same is true for the  litigant who
accrues full legal fees for motions, discovery 
and trial preparation before settlement is nego­
tiated on the proverbial courthouse steps. 
In light of these, the inability to tolerate 
that risk further weakened the bargaining
position of the less wealthy and less powerful 
party.  Among the first systemic reforms pro­
posed by the ADR “movement” was earlier 
intervention to see if settlement was desirable 
or possible. These took the form of institu­
tionalized prompts for settlement discussions, 
access to mediation programs and  mediator 
panels long before trial was contemplated. 
Some court-related ADR programs were 
targeted to early-stage litigation. It may have 
been impolite to mention the conflict between 
some lawyers’ desire to bill more and clients 
desire to keep fees low. 
Yet ADR practitioners knew it to be real. 
We also knew of lawyers and parties who 
might have welcomed earlier, more efficient 
moves but worried about “signaling weakness.” 
Institutionalized ADR prompts alleviated that 
concern. 
In some cases, the parties chose settle­
ments that might not have been available with­
out ADR. In many, settlements were reached 
much earlier because of these ADR programs. 
Thus, it seems clear that ADR served to reduce 
power imbalances, at least to some degree, in 
some cases. 
ABOUT POWER IMBALANCE 
Over the past 30-plus years, one arena in which 
ADR has facilitated traditionally less power­
ful groups to exercise real power has been in 
class action or multi-district, multi-plaintiff 
litigation. 
One can look to the series of gender and 
race discrimination class-action suits filed
against the big-name investment firms as well 
as large consumer claims suits resolved in ADR 
Commentary
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processes. Drawing upon examples with which 
I’m familiar, programmatic relief was written 
into settlement documents, publicly filed, in 
the Merrill Lynch and Wells Fargo gender and 
race discrimination cases. 
With the assistance of the finest ADR sys­
tems design professionals and mediators, these
were fashioned and negotiated with plaintiff ’s
counsel, class representatives, and defense coun­
sel. These actors were closely familiar with the
way certain employment practices and policies
facilitated discrimination as well as corporate
interests, operations, and constraints.
These settlements resulted in corporate, 
class-wide, and individual redress and reform 
measures that would not have been achiev­
able otherwise. Without question, these pro­
cesses shifted the traditional balance of power 
between the parties in a positive way. Not 
guilty, ADR! 
I can’t resist noting that discussion of ADR 
power imbalances ignores the larger realm
in which aggrieved parties decide whether to 
raise claims, retain counsel, file suit, and settle 
without any third-party neutral involvement. 
An employee who needs her job may not
raise claims that the company is shorting her
commission payments. It should be common
knowledge by now that employees who complain
about racial or sexual harassment or discrimina­
tion risk retaliation, the U.S. Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission notwithstanding. If
they can’t afford the risk, nothing happens.
An employee may not be able to afford
legal advice regarding his complaint, and so
may suffer injustice—unlawful injustice to. If
the employee does take the complaint to the
employer, with or without counsel, what realistic
chance does he have of negotiating a settlement?
Power imbalances are real. They occur
despite the law, outside of the formal legal 
system, with no realistic path to legal redress. 
Practice Skills 
(continued from page 134) 
Scenario No. 2, the Chinese company does 
not want to purchase the required amounts of 
Strong-arming by financial power, and dis­
regard for legal standards, are much more likely
where grievances are stated privately, counsel
has not been retained, or even with counsel, suit
has not been filed. Greater financial resources or
higher social, political, or employment positions
translate to more power. It is both obvious and
unfortunate, but nevertheless true.
The universe outside of ADR is entirely at 
the mercy of power imbalances. ADR does not 
create these, nor can it erase them. We do the 
best we can. 
IN OUR 
OWN ROOMS 
Within ADR’s house, and now in our arbi­
tration and mediation rooms, we mediators, 
court ADR administrators, process designers, 
and arbitrators can construct and conduct
processes that reflect moral values our  law 
makers seem to have abandoned. I’m recall­
ing mediations and arbitrations with parties 
mystified or overwhelmed by costs, vagaries, 
and the aggressive tenor of litigation. Or par­
ties pinning all hopes and resources on victory 
unlikely to be realized. 
Sometimes, parties are trapped within con­
structed narratives of demons and foul deeds 
of former colleagues; they seek vindication and 
restoration of pride. Too often, despite coun­
sel’s best efforts, they are unable to see through 
the legal thicket. 
In employment discrimination cases, the 
employer feels extorted, the employee suffers 
financial and psychological loss or disorienta­
tion. Plaintiffs want assurance that this won’t 
happen again, that their claim will protect 
others. On both sides, litigation’s complaints, 
answers, counterclaims, document discovery 
burdens, deposition cross examinations, can 
bruise and burn. 
Autonomy and control are surrendered to 
judge, magistrate and/or the specter of a jury. 
As arbitrators, we can fit the process
rules to the circumstances. We can exercise
natural gas because the pandemic has reduced 
the demand for the product. 
By contrast, in the third and fourth
scenarios, the nonperforming party seeks
to avoid liability based on circumstances
created by the pandemic that prevent
discretion to streamline and reduce cost
burdens. We can run pre-hearing confer­
ences in a respectful and even-handed man­
ner, recognizing the challenges faced by the
parties and counsel. We can patiently allow
a pro se claimant to make a case and waive
strict technicalities. We can respectfully
hear what parties and counsel wish to say,
without cutting them off due to evidentiary
rules. 
While required to make decisions consis­
tent with operative law (in most instances), 
arbitrators can make well-reasoned, accessible, 
fair, and equitable rulings and awards. 
As mediators, we can seek to create some 
good within the mediation process. We listen, 
we seek to understand and respect the parties, 
lawyers, and their experience of the conflict. 
We can gently explain negotiation and legal 
realities the parties won’t or can’t hear from 
their lawyers, while leaving choices in the par­
ties’ hands. 
Case law and statutes are what they are. 
Mediators can offer or facilitate solutions that 
address people’s business, professional or emo­
tional needs and aspirations. We can lead peo­
ple to find their way out of a litigated conflict 
trap that saps resources, energy, and emotional 
equilibrium. 
We can conduct a process that enables 
people—even executives are people—to reckon 
with those they believe to have perpetrated or 
suffered harm. We can aid them in restoring 
some control over the destiny of their dispute, 
and own the decision to settle or not, subject to 
agreement by both sides. 
Thankfully, within our tiny mediation and 
arbitration rooms in ADR’s house, we can
choose to be strong advocates for respectful, 
fair, and humane process. 
The polity crumbles and my reality-based
despair at craven actors’ exercise of power
remains. Fortunately, we need not be neutral
about the integrity and humanity with which we
conduct dispute resolution in our own spaces.
No regrets.
performance. In particular, in Scenario
No. 3, the reduced workforce caused by
widespread infection prevents the German
supplier from timely providing the required
services, while in Scenario No. 4, the gov­
ernment order prevents the conference
